Social impacts of the Forest Stewardship Council certification in the Congo basin by Cerutti, Paolo Omar et al.
50  International Forestry Review Vol.19(S2), 2017
Social impacts of the Forest Stewardship Council certifi-
cation in the Congo basin
P.O. CERUTTIa, G. LESCUYERa,b, L. TACCONIc, R. EBA’A ATYIa, E. ESSIANEa, R. NASIa, P.P. TABI ECKEBILa,d and 
R. TSANGAa
aCenter for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Indonesia
bCentre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement (CIRAD), France
cCrawford School of Economics and Government, The Australian National University (ANU), Australia
dUniversité de Liège - Gembloux AgroBio-Tech - Département BIOSE (ULG), Belgium
Email: p.cerutti@cgiar.org
SUMMARY
We assess whether the implementation of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification scheme in the Congo basin has had positive 
additional impacts—as compared to existing regulatory frameworks applied in noncertified Forest Management Units (FMU)—on (1) the 
working and living conditions of logging companies’ employees and their families, (2) the effectiveness and legitimacy of the institutions and 
benefit-sharing mechanisms set up to regulate relationships between logging companies and neighbouring communities, and (3) the local 
populations’ rights to and customary uses of forests. Results on (1) and (2) suggest that several significant differences exist between certified 
and noncertified FMUs. Results are instead mitigated on (3): Companies in certified FMUs tend to better enforce the law, but this may 
have unwanted negative impacts on customary uses. We discuss the reasons why several positive social outcomes materialised in certified vs. 
noncertified areas, and suggest possible improvements as well as required further research. 
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Les impacts sociaux de la certification du Forest Stewardship Council dans le bassin du Congo
P.O. CERUTTI, G. LESCUYER, L. TACCONI, R. EBA’A ATYI, E. ESSIANE, R. NASI, P.P. ABI ECKEBIL et R. TSANGA
Nous évaluons si la mise en œuvre de la certification du Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) dans le bassin du Congo a eu des impacts positifs 
et additionnels—par rapport aux lois et règlements appliquées aux Unités Forestieres d’Amenagement (UFA) non certifiées—sur (1) les 
conditions de vie et de travail des employés des sociétés forestières et des leurs familles, (2) l’efficacité et la légitimité des institutions et des 
mécanismes de partage des bénéfices mis en place pour réguler les relations entre les sociétés d’exploitation forestière et les communautés 
riveraines, et (3) les droits et usages coutumiers des populations locales. Les résultats sur (1) et (2) suggèrent que plusieurs différences signifi-
catives existent entre UFA certifiées et non certifiées. Les résultats sont par contre mitigés sur (3): les entreprises dans les UFA certifiées ont 
tendance à mieux faire appliquer la loi, mais cela peut avoir des effets négatifs indésirables sur les usages coutumiers. Nous discutons les raisons 
pour lesquelles certains résultats sociaux positifs se sont matérialisés dans les UFA certifiées vs. les UFA non certifiées, et suggérons des 
améliorations possibles ainsi que des pistes pour des plus amples recherches a conduire.
Impactos sociales de la certificación del Consejo de Manejo Forestal de la cuenca del Congo
P.O. CERUTTI, G. LESCUYER, L. TACCONI, R. EBA’A ATYI, E. ESSIANE, R. NASI, P.P. ABI ECKEBIL y R. TSANGA
Evaluamos si la aplicación del esquema de certificación de Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) en la cuenca del Congo ha tenido impactos adi-
cionales positivos en comparación con los marcos regulatorios existentes y aplicados en las Unidades de Gestión Forestal no certificadas (UGF) 
– en (1) los condiciones de bienestar de los empleados de las compañías y sus familias, (2) la eficacia y legitimidad de las instituciones y los 
mecanismos de participación en los beneficios establecidos para regular las relaciones entre las empresas madereras y las comunidades vecinas, 
y (3) los derechos de las poblaciones locales y los usos consuetudinarios de bosques. Resultados en (1) y (2) sugieren que existen varias 
diferencias significativas entre las UGF certificadas y no certificadas. Los resultados son mitigados en (3): las empresas certificadas tienden a 
cumplir mejor la ley, pero esto puede tener impactos negativos no deseados en los usos consuetudinarios. Se discuten las razones por las que 
varios resultados sociales positivos se materializaron en la certificación vs. áreas no certificadas, y se sugieren posibles mejoras, así como 
también áreas donde más investigación es necesaria.
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and their families, (2) the effectiveness and legitimacy of the 
institutions and benefit-sharing mechanisms set up to regulate 
relationships between companies and neighbouring commu-
nities, and (3) the latter’s rights and customary uses. 
We focus on social impacts because both the FSC and all 
current regulatory frameworks in the countries of the Congo 
basin have a strong social component that seeks to improve 
relationships between logging companies and local popula-
tions while contributing to local development. This provides 
a suitable comparative environment against which certified 
FMUs can be assessed. Also, we focus on the Congo basin 
because it has one of the largest certified areas of natural 
tropical forests in the world, with about 5.5 million ha as of 
May 2015 (info.fsc.org). 
In this article, the term institutions is used to refer to 
associations, committees and platforms set up to facilitate 
discussions between the local populations and logging 
companies and foster local development. Benefit-sharing 
mechanisms refer to various schemes, mandated by law or 
adopted in certified FMUs, set up with the purpose of redis-
tributing to the local populations part of the (mostly financial) 
benefits accrued to logging companies through their use 
of the FMUs (e.g. see Cerutti et al. 2010 for an example on 
Cameroon).
We focus on institutions and benefit-sharing schemes 
because i) shortcomings in their implementation represent 
one of the major corrective actions required of logging 
companies by FSC auditors (Newsom and Hewitt 2005), and 
ii) discussion platforms and committees between logging 
companies and the FMUs’ neighbouring populations are man-
dated by all forest laws in the region. Indeed, they stem from 
the decentralization of natural resource management that has 
been underway since the late colonial period (1950s) in many 
countries, including those in the Congo basin, with the objec-
tive of empowering local people and marginalized groups 
(Karsenty 1997, Larson and Ribot 2005, Colfer 2011). How-
ever, the proliferation of local institutions in the Congo basin 
has so far largely failed to deliver positive economic and 
social impacts (Assembe Mvondo 2005, Oyono and Efoua 
2006). We believe it is therefore relevant to investigate to 
what degree the more recent institutions created through the 
forest laws or supported by FSC certification have achieved 
those positive impacts.
We proceed by providing a short background on the legal 
frameworks in sampled countries (i.e. Cameroon, Gabon and 
the Republic of Congo, the only three countries in the Congo 
basin with FSC-certified FMUs), with particular reference to 
how social issues are tackled there. This is relevant because 
the potential improvements brought in by forest certification 
can be better understood when compared to the baseline legal 
scenario under which all FMUs should be normally managed. 
Next, we describe the methods used, followed by a presenta-
tion of the main results. We will then discuss the major 
findings and explore potential ways forward, both in terms 
of future research and policy implications. The last section 
draws the conclusions.
INTRODUCTION
Forest certification emerged in the first half of the 1990s as a 
market-based response to the failure of intergovernmental 
processes to establish a global compact on forests. Since then, 
it has been promoted as a means to tackle global deforestation 
and forest degradation, as well as to address the growing 
concerns for sustainability shown by part of the industry 
and civil society around the globe (Lambin et al. 2014). 
The underlying logic is that the market should be able to 
reward companies producing timber according to rigorous, 
comprehensive and independently audited standards (Steer-
ing Committee 2012). 
Among existing forest certification schemes, the one 
offered by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is the most 
prominent for the certification of responsible forest manage-
ment in the tropics. The analytical framework under which it 
is generally assessed defines it as: i) a non-state governance 
system, because it is an alternative to traditional public regu-
lation; ii) voluntary, because forest enterprises may choose to 
adhere; iii) market-based, because it is driven by international 
markets and consumers’ choices; and iv) third-party, because 
participating enterprises are regularly audited by an external 
entity, itself also periodically audited (Cashore et al. 2004, 
Cashore et al. 2005, Marx and Cuypers 2010). In essence, the 
FSC scheme checks companies and forest management units 
(FMUs) against a set of principles, criteria and indicators to 
assess whether management is environmentally appropriate, 
socially beneficial and economically viable.
Since 1993, the birthdate of the FSC, many have acknowl-
edged its positive impacts on international standard setting, 
particularly the increased legitimacy of third-party-audited 
products on the world’s markets (e.g. Cashore et al. 2004, 
Steering Committee 2012), and on public policies in general 
(Agrawal et al. 2008, Overdevest and Zeitlin 2014). As for 
impacts on the world’s forests, much scattered evidence 
suggests that localized positive impacts exist in or around 
certified FMUs (e.g. Durst et al. 2006, Espach 2006, Auld 
et al. 2008, van Kuijk et al. 2009, Cerutti et al. 2011). Yet, it 
remains difficult to generate and thus replicate lessons learned 
at the global scale (Blackman and Rivera 2011, Romero et al. 
2013, Visseren-Hamakers and Pattberg 2013). This is for two 
main reasons. First, there exist methodological difficulties 
in isolating the effects of forest certification from those of 
external processes like new policies, existing legislation, or 
the overall political-economic situation under which certifica-
tion develops (Bass et al. 2001, Chan and Pound 2009). 
Second, there remain many knowledge gaps, particularly in 
some regions of the world, where certification developed later 
than in others. 
This article seeks to contribute to filling that knowledge 
gap by assessing the social impacts of FSC-certified FMUs 
vs. noncertified FMUs in tropical natural forests in the Congo 
basin. We tested the three hypotheses that the presence of an 
FSC certificate—in line with the more general FSC philoso-
phy as also reflected in the FSC standards—has had a positive 
impact on (1) the working and living conditions of employees 
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THE FORESTRY SECTOR IN THE CASE-STUDY 
COUNTRIES
The selected countries’ forestry sectors present many analo-
gies in terms of their history, policies and social and gover-
nance challenges. Forests are largely registered as public 
lands, and are divided over vast swathes of territory into large-
scale logging concessions. Notably, over the last couple of 
decades all countries underwent structural adjustment plans 
that modified the fiscal regimes applied to logging conces-
sions, as well as their social and environmental requirements.
The formal, large-scale, industrial forestry sector in the 
three countries contributes similar percentages of their GDPs 
and it generally represents the second largest employer after 
agriculture (Table 1).
Also similar among countries and to the aims of the FSC, 
are the legally mandated social obligations and benefit-
sharing mechanisms (Table 1). In all countries, there exist 
also private schemes that logging companies used to stipulate 
even before the advent of the FSC with the neighbouring 
populations, notably in the form of contractual agreements 
or cahiers des charges: They list in-kind or monetary contri-
butions promised by the company to the populations. All 
these similarities among countries come to no surprise, as all 
current forest laws in the countries of the Congo basin were 
influenced by the 1992 Rio Declaration on the principles 
of sustainable forest management, as is the FSC. Also, the 
case-study countries have ratified the major relevant interna-
tional conventions (such as those on labour and human rights), 
which are also reflected in the FSC standards. 
Customary rights, including agricultural activities, hunt-
ing and non-timber forest products (NTFP) gathering, receive 
similar treatment in the regulations of the three countries. In 
general, they are guaranteed provided there is no commercial 
purpose (i.e. only self-consumption). Hunting and NTFP 
collection must also be conducted with ‘traditional’ means 
(e.g. hunting without the use of guns), while agricultural 
fields cannot be extended further than the surfaces already 
cultivated at the moment of the allocation of the FMU, unless 
located in specially designated agroforestry or agricultural 
zones within the FMU. 
 TABLE 1 Key aspects of the formal forestry sector in case-study countries
Cameroon Gabon Republic of the Congo
Sector as percent of GDP 4 4.3 5.6
Employment (% of agricultural 
sector)
22 000 (0.3%) 13 000 (2.4%) 7 400 (0.4%)
Allocated concessions (No. / million 
ha)
111 / 7.1 57 / 11.6 52 / 11.9
Concessions with approved manage-
ment plans (No. / million ha / % of 
total concessions)
72 / 5 / 65% 26 / 6.1 / 31% 7 / 3.6 / 13%
Concessions FSC (No. / million ha / 
% of concessions with approved 
management plans)
14 / 0.9 / 19% 6 / 1.9 / 31% 4 / 2.5 / 70%
Compulsory social security Yes, social security fund 
(Caisse Nationale de 
Prévoyance Sociale)
Yes, social security fund 
(caisse nationale de sécurité 
sociale) and health and social 
security fund (caisse 
nationale d’assurance 
maladie et de garantie 
sociale, since 2013)
Yes, social security fund (Caisse 
nationale de sécurité sociale)
Guaranteed customary rights 
(agriculture, hunting, NTFP 
collection) inside concessions
Yes, with traditional 
means and for personal 
consumption. Farmers 
can maintain fields that 
existed before the 
creation of the FMU, 
but are not authorized to 
open new ones
Yes, with traditional means 
and only for personal 
consumption or local trade. 
Must be conducted only by 
the local population, i.e. 
living in the village
Yes, with traditional means and 
for personal consumption
Legally-mandated benefit-sharing 
mechanisms
Yes, area-based fee 
(redevance forestière 
annuelle)
Yes, but regulation to be 
completed
Yes, area-based fee (redevance de 
superficie) and local development 
fund (Fonds de Développement 
Local) only in FMUs with an 
approved management plan
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to the small number of certified FMUs). This was done to 
decrease the probability that similar results, especially in 
working conditions, would be due to shared management 
regimes. In other words, we aimed to include in the sample of 
certified FMUs the largest number of companies or groups, 
i.e. management regimes.
Next, to pair certified and noncertified FMUs a two-stage 
matching procedure was adopted. First, coarse matching 
(Gertler et al. 2011), i.e. a screening process based upon 
available secondary data and expert judgment (Glew et al. 
2012), was used to select the ‘universe’ of noncertified FMUs 
in which institutions and villages with similar observable 
characteristics to those in certified FMUs were likely to be 
located. Second, within the radius of potential FMUs, we 
aimed at maximising similarity between the treatment (FSC) 
and control group (non-FSC) by selecting proxy variables that 
should contribute to reducing observable biases and system-
atic differences between institutions and villages in certified 
vs. noncertified FMUs (Table 2).
To account for potentially different perceptions of the 
impacts of forestry operations, and the effectiveness of social 
structures or processes in the same FMU during different 
stages of the logging process, four villages neighbouring 
or inside each FMU were selected in areas where forestry 
operations were currently on-going, were planned for the 
coming year, or had been completed in the previous year or 
two. In total, surveys were conducted in 69 villages.1 Villages 
were selected after information about logging history had 
been received from the concerned companies. Where there 
was a choice of more than one village for each stage (4 cases), 
the more easily accessible villages were selected. Given that 
forestry operations are conducted on the entire annual allow-
able surface, we believe this latter choice does not introduce 
biases in the results.
After the selection of the nine certified and nine noncerti-
fied FMUs (three in each category from Cameroon, Gabon 
and the Republic of the Congo), in order to test the three 
hypotheses listed above, we undertook a review of the mecha-
nisms adopted by concerned logging companies to regulate 
working conditions in sawmills and forestry operations, and 
to sustain relationships with villages neighbouring the FMUs. 
This task involved preliminary analysis of the documentation 
available from companies in certified and noncertified FMUs, 
in particular their management plans and socioeconomic 
studies, as well as the planned social procedures and relevant 
written policies. The bulk of this material shows the mecha-
nisms adopted by forest managers to address social issues but 
it does not provide definitive evidence of the quality of their 
implementation.
After selection, companies and villages were contacted 
and asked whether they were willing to participate in the 
study, under conditions of anonymity and confidentiality. 
Two companies, one certified and one noncertified, declined 
to participate in the study. Thus, access to company data and 
The latter provision is particularly problematic. The logic 
on which it is based is that if an FMU is supposed to be man-
aged sustainably, allowing shifting cultivation inside it could 
mean no control over land that is mandated by law to remain 
forested and to guarantee the biodiversity of the country. 
However, such logic does not lead to conflict only if other 
legal provisions were respected, notably the one mandating 
consultation and negotiations over the final boundaries of 
each FMU, to be held between the State and the local popula-
tions, before the granting of FMUs. As this has rarely been 
the case, logging companies have often been granted FMUs 
with the implicit responsibility to conduct such negotiations 
a posteriori, i.e. during the drafting of the management plan 
and while logging activities were already on-going. 
Differences among countries also remain in both imple-
mentation and control. First and foremost, existing manage-
ment plans are said to be still too much oriented towards 
timber production without enough attention paid to social 
issues (Vandenhaute and Doucet 2006, Lescuyer et al. 2012). 
Second, public benefit-sharing mechanisms and the institu-
tions created for the management of the redistributed amounts 
have experienced different fortunes. Cameroon’s redistribu-
tion scheme has been running for more than a decade with 
weak positive impacts on rural livelihoods (Cerutti et al. 
2010), the Republic of Congo experiences a partial imple-
mentation, and in Gabon, more than a decade after the adop-
tion of the law, the implementing regulation is still partially 
developed. 
It is against such background that FSC certificates started 
to be granted at the end of 2005 (after a failed attempt in 
Gabon in 1996), first to a Cameroonian FMU and then to 
other FMUs in the Republic of the Congo and in Gabon. As 
of 2013, when this research started, certificates in the three 
countries covered an area of about 5.3 million ha and 24 
FMUs representing between 19 and 70 percent of FMUs with 
an approved management plan (Table 1). These numbers are 
still arguably low when compared to the total area that could 
potentially be covered with management plans and certifica-
tion. However, before certification extends further in the 
region, we believe it is appropriate to try and assess what 
impacts, if any, it has had on several social indicators. The 
next section explains how we measured such impacts.
METHODS
Selection of FMUs and villages
In each country, three FMUs certified by FSC as of April 2013 
(when this research started) were selected. Selection was 
not random because, given the small number of companies 
engaged in certification, we tried to minimize the use of 
multiple certified FMUs owned by the same company or 
group (although this could not be avoided in one country due 
1
 The total number of planned villages was 72. Three villages were not reachable due to heavy storms and a lack of canoes and alternative 
tracks. They could not be replaced because no other village neighboring the concerned FMUs existed.
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staff was not granted, and results on working and living 
conditions thus compare 16 FMUs (eight certified and eight 
noncertified). Companies’ participation required willingness 
of managers to be interviewed and to share both public and (if 
needed) internal documents. Because of the risk of companies 
influencing workers and village residents (e.g. their state-
ments during interviews), companies were asked to facilitate 
access to facilities only where absolutely needed in order 
for the study to proceed (e.g. where access to FMUs must 
be granted by the company management team), but in all 
cases interviews were conducted in the absence of companies’ 
representatives.
Surveys
In selected FMUs, surveys were conducted in two different 
settings. First, we asked company managers and staff 
questions related to working conditions and living standards 
of staff and their families—both at the work site, i.e. sawmill 
or harvesting site, and in the bases vie or compounds where 
the company provides housing, services and facilities for 
workers and their families. Second, questions related to 
institutions and customary rights were asked in the villages 
neighbouring the FMUs: Focus-groups, one-to-one inter-
views and social transects (de Zeeuw and Wilbers 2004, NGO 
Programme Karnataka-Tamil Nadu 2005) were all used to 
collect and triangulate information. 
Where the sociocultural environment did not favour good 
representation of women in focus-group discussions, the 
interviewers tried to hold separate discussions with women. 
Interviews were conducted by seven people—two women and 
five men—rotating through the three countries in teams of 
three in different periods from May to September 2013. Inter-
views were conducted in the local language where necessary, 
but more often in French.
A total of 69 village focus-group discussions were held, 
along with 364 one-to-one semi-structured interviews and 52 
social transects (Table 3). 
Assessed variables were organized under three themes as 
summarized in Table 4. 
External, non-resident people (including elites living in 
urban centres, government officials and representatives or 
workers of neighbouring logging companies) were also 
interviewed to complement and verify the accuracy of factual 
information collected in the villages (e.g. amounts of taxes 
paid and existence of new management rules and invest-
ments). In these interviews, we asked about their perceptions 
of institutions and their representatives, the most common 
types of conflict and their underlying interests. 
 TABLE 2 Variables used in pairing FMUs
Variable Explanation
Alternative employment 
opportunities in the area
Similar employment opportunities focused on forestry operations help ensure that local economic 
impacts are largely based on those operations. FMUs close to adjacent forestry operations by other 
companies, large mining or agro-industrial sites could introduce biases (e.g. leakage) in local working 
conditions. 
Dependence on cash crops 
for livelihoods and access 
to markets
Revenues generated through different cash crops and by easier access to local or regional markets 
could introduce biases in the historical capacities of people to organize themselves into cooperatives or 
conflict-prevention/resolution institutions.
Ethnicity This is a proxy for social structure. Selecting different social structures could introduce biases on the 
customary norms in place (including gender roles), with impacts on i) the way negotiations with 
outsiders, including logging companies, are conducted, ii) the setting up and management of local 
institutions, and iii) the implementation of special rules of exclusion or regulation of the use of 
resources by the local population within and around FMUs.
Political/administrative 
jurisdictions 
Different District or other relevant administrative unit officers could introduce biases in the way 
institutions, benefit-sharing mechanisms and customary uses are managed, supervised or sanctioned. 
This is because decentralised officers play important roles in i) conflict prevention and resolution, ii) 
controlling (and sanctioning if need be) the behaviour of companies and citizens where operations 
occur, iii) supervising the management of benefit-sharing mechanisms, and iv) mediating discussions 
on damage compensation by logging companies to the local populations for damages caused by 
forestry activities. 
Presence of a management 
plan
This control was introduced to avoid overestimating the impacts of FSC certification, and was based 
on the assumption that, if a plan existed, even in draft form in noncertified FMUs, social interactions 
with neighbouring villages would likely have already taken place, as mandated by the law, and their 
impacts could be assessed.
Species harvested by 
logging companies and 
markets served
By selecting FMUs that produce similar tree species or products and largely serve similar markets, 
we tried to reduce biases introduced in the decisions taken by companies about whether to adhere to 
certification. This remains a debatable variable because it is also highly dependent on the market 
strategies of different companies, which are considered confidential and may change over time.
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TABLE 3 Types of surveys
Survey Format Certified/noncertified (gender)
Conditions of workers in forestry and sawmill operations One to one 27/26 (all men)
Managers of logging companies One to one 7/7 (3 women and 11 men)
Active members of committees, associations or local 
platforms
One to one 12/8 (3 women and 17 men)
External members of active committees (local officials, 
mayors, NGO representatives)
One to one 11/3 (4 women and 10 men)
Population of villages neighbouring the FMUs Focus group 34/35
Farmers, hunters and gatherers from villages neighbouring 
the FMUs
One to one 134/125 (107 women and 152 men)
Social transects (generally with village chief or delegate) One to one 26/24 (all men)
Informal and unstructured interviews One to one and one to many 58/53 (gender not recorded)
 TABLE 4 Themes and variables
Theme Working conditions at logging 
sites and in and around sawmills, 
and living conditions in and 
around the bases vie
Institutions, consultation, and benefit-
sharing mechanisms, and living 
conditions in and around neighbouring 
villages
Customary rights to forest resources
Variables •  Existence and condition of 
mini-markets (économats)
•  Institutions and their governance •  Existence and quality of mechanisms 
for compensation of damages to 
property, resources and livelihoods
•  Availability and quality of 
water
•  Evidence for existence and quality 
of public consultation
•  Quality, availability of, and impacts 
on rights to game, land, and NTFPs
•  Safety conditions and quality 
of mechanisms to address 
injuries
•  Existence and types of mechanisms 
for consultation, sharing of 
outcomes and follow-up consulta-
tion with neighbouring villages
•  Existence and enforcement of 
negotiated rules and their perceptions 
by the local population
•  Existence and implementation 
of rules for employment of 
local population
•  Quality and quantity of benefits
•  Salary ranges •  Quality of impacts
•  Type of social insurance 
provided by the company and 
whether it is in line with 
national requirements
•  Availability and quality of health 
services
•  Type of associative bodies •  Availability and quality of education 
opportunities
•  Quality of housing •  Types of infrastructure provided
•  Existence of cultural assets (e.g. 
community halls and churches)
Note: “Workers” are understood as all people paid for work, directly by the company and indirectly through subcontractors.
In order to better triangulate the information, the survey 
teams spent several days researching each FMU, always 
residing in the villages where the procedures were supposed 
to take place and affect living conditions. In addition to 
the formal questions asked during formal interviews, we 
crosschecked answers through more than 100 informal inter-
views, asking questions on whether and how procedures (e.g. 
obligation to wear safety gears) as described in available 
documents (e.g. management plans or internal policies) were 
being implemented during the everyday lives of workers and 
their families.
Lastly, data from certified and noncertified FMUs across 
the three countries were pooled and compared. Although a 
brief country background has been presented in the previous 
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section, grouping FMUs and companies working in different 
socio-political contexts in different countries might obscure 
important country-related trends and preclude lessons to 
be learnt on a country basis. Nonetheless, the anonymity 
requested by companies and state officials alike in the 
three countries and the small available sample dictated our 
decision. Yet, all analyses were initially conducted on a 
per-country basis. Although the aggregate values of a few 
variables are influenced by one country more than another, 
overall results do not show significant differences among 
countries for most variables. This is also likely a consequence 
of all countries having very similar legal frameworks and 
coming under the same FSC regional standard. Although 
more in-country research is indeed needed, this makes us con-
fident that no major trend has been overlooked by aggregating 
country-level data.
Limitations of the study
Many evidences from the Congo basin indicate that at least up 
to the end of the 1990s, prior to the advent of certification and 
before logging concessions as we know them today became 
the most common way of conducting forestry operations, 
the modus operandi was very much similar among logging 
companies, with illegal logging and social conflicts with 
neighbouring populations being recurrent features (e.g. 
Durrieu de Madron and Ngaha 2000, Auzel and Halford 2002, 
Auzel et al. 2004).
Within such background, and with the experiences 
collected by the authors over more than a decade spent in the 
Congo basin conducting research on similar topics, we are 
confident that the results of this study can very plausibly be 
attributed to the advent of certification.
Yet, we also remain cognizant that the design applied in 
this study is not rigorous enough to establish causality, as 
would be the case in an experimental or quasi-experimental 
design with a more statistically rigorous construction of the 
counterfactual (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008, Sekhon 2009, 
Rosenbaum 2010, Gertler et al. 2011). Indeed, there might be 
variables—observable and unobservable—other than those 
considered here that could have affected the probability 
of becoming certified in the first place, such as managers’ 
specific preferences or market-dependent decisions. For that 
reason, a few plausible complementary explanations for the 
results obtained will thus be provided when necessary.
 RESULTS
Working and living conditions
Working and living conditions can broadly be divided into 
two categories: those that exist in the workplace (forest or the 
sawmill), such as the existence of clear written rules for the 
use of safety equipment, and those that exist at the base vie 
(company housing provided for staff and their families), such 
as written procedures for house occupancy.
Several indicators do not present significant differences 
between certified and noncertified FMUs. Such indicators are 
linked to the existence of ‘services’ that forestry workers and 
governments alike have historically considered essential for 
operations to start and continue without overt conflict occur-
ring, even before the advent of certification (indicators 1–2, 
4–5 and 10, Table 5). Companies with certified FMUs invest 
more time and money in improving the quality of such service 
tough, as well as tending to their maintenance. For instance, 
in the certified group, higher satisfaction with prices in the 
économats (a kind of minimarket provided by the company 
where workers, their families, and often the general popula-
tion can buy daily necessities), as compared to prices in 
nearby villages or towns, is generally due to the fact that 
certified companies subsidize prices by refraining from 
charging for transportation from the closest markets. The 
same holds for providing and maintaining a permanent 
system for delivering both potable and non-potable water, 
as well as electricity, able to reach all homes in the base vie 
and to support all basic water and energy needs (drinking, 
washing and cooking). 
Certified FMUs also perform significantly better in rela-
tion to having written and enforced procedures in place to 
regulate working and living activities. For instance, most 
companies provide safety equipment (indicator 5, Table 5), 
but in noncertified FMUs the correct use of equipment is 
rarely verified by a dedicated staff (indicator 6, Table 5). 
Health-related indicators (indicators 7, 8, and 9, Table 5) 
arguably provide the clearest sign of distinction between 
certified and noncertified FMUs, with the quality of the ser-
vices and facilities provided setting them apart. The average 
number of staff served by medical personnel (doctors, nurses 
and other caregivers) was similar between certified and 
noncertified FMUs (80 and 88, respectively). However, 
companies in certified FMUs employed more professional 
and permanent staff, e.g. doctors and nurses with national 
certifications or diplomas who are regularly available onsite, 
compared to a larger number of less formally trained caregiv-
ers in noncertified FMUs.
Neither companies in certified nor those in noncertified 
FMUs had special contracting conditions for hiring or 
retaining young employees (no longer legally minors but still 
lacking work experience).2 Also, gender-disaggregated data 
showed a highly imbalanced workforce, with both certified 
and noncertified companies employing about 97% men. 
Overall, a significant association existed between certifi-
cation and whether companies had one or more active and 
officially recognized associative bodies with a mandate for 
collective bargaining with companies on issues including 
salaries and safety and health conditions (indicator 16, 
Table 5). In all cases where such associations exist, they were 
2
 The three study countries have ratified ILO Convention 138 (Minimum Age Convention, 1973), but have not integrated it into their national 
laws. Currently, the legal minimum age for employment is 14 years in Cameroon and Congo and 15 years in Gabon.
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acknowledged and integrated into the companies’ internal 
working procedures. Regular meetings occur between staff 
and company representatives, where complaints registered on 
logbooks are discussed and settled. Despite the consideration 
given to staff associations, only 25% of certified FMUs and 
none of the noncertified ones had clear written procedures for 
resolution of conflicts between the staff association and the 
company (indicator 17, Table 5). 
Institutions and benefit-sharing mechanisms
Active institutions, such as officially registered platforms of 
discussion and various forms of associative bodies, estab-
lished by, or having received funds or other means from, the 
current logging company, are significantly more present in 
certified than in noncertified FMUs (indicators 1–3, Table 6). 
Qualitative findings indicate that, among institutions that 
pre-existed the current logging companies, those in certified 
FMUs (37%) were more active, more effective and better 
managed than those in noncertified FMUs (80%). This may 
be because certified companies supported the institution 
whether or not they helped establish it (the reported target was 
smooth, long-term social appeasement over the entire FMU), 
while in noncertified FMUs, most logging companies were 
more interested in institutions established by them, normally 
in areas where forestry operations were on-going (the 
reported target was smooth, short-term social appeasement 
in annual cutting areas).
Several variables were assessed to check how effectively 
institutions were governed (indicators 4–7, Table 6). Signifi-
cant differences exist in the presence of negotiated, written 
and approved procedures (e.g. a statute) that regulate the 
management and functioning of the institution. Also, institu-
tions around certified FMUs are more likely to elect and 
periodically renew their members, and to allow external 
members to participate in official meetings. The rationale 
for the assessment of these variables was that (1) elected 
members and their periodical renewal were more likely to 
represent different lineages and (2) the participation of exter-
nal members (such as decentralised state officials and NGOs) 
could encourage more transparent and technically sound 
decisions in the adoption and implementation of projects. 
As a proxy for effectiveness, we also asked to check the 
minutes of the meetings that occurred in 2012 and 2013. They 
were provided in all cases in certified FMUs and in 67% 
of noncertified FMUs. The presence of minutes is relevant 
because, when they are lacking, people cannot refer to 
officially recorded points of discussion to check the status of 
their complaint, that is, if follow-up actions have been taken 
by the company.
In the event of loss or damage affecting the property, 
resources, health or livelihoods of local populations neigh-
bouring FMUs, companies are held responsible and complaints 
are addressed to them. Overall, a significant association 
existed between certification and whether companies adopted 
and implemented mechanisms for the compensation of 
TABLE 5 Synthesis of results (working and living conditions, percent of sampled FMUs)
  FSC non-FSC
Working conditions in sampled FMUs (N=16)   
1 Economat 100% 100%
2 Potable water 86% 67%
3 Individual home showers and WC systems 100% 46%***
4 Electricity to bases vie (24/7) 100% 50%
5 Provision of safety gear 100% 75%
6 Procedures to control and verify use of safety equipment 90% 25%**
7 Health- and life-insurance provided to all staff 100% 25%***
8 Local medical facilities 100% 38%**
9 Injuries-related procedures 88% 12%***
10 Staff with permanent contract 87% 72%
11 Women over total staff 3% 3%
12 Salary range higher than national collective agreements 57% 25%
13 House with durable materials in bases vie 87% 40%
14 Written procedures for house occupancy 88% 29%**
15 Written procedures for waste collection and treatment 100% 20%***
16 Active associative bodies (e.g. unions) 100% 25%***
17 Written procedures for conflict resolution 25% 0%
Notes: .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *.
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when an FMU is granted by the state to a private company for 
logging, the company must accommodate local uses as long 
as they do not oppose existing laws. Hence, since changing 
an FMU boundary is a legally complex process, managing 
conflicting forest uses is mainly incumbent on logging 
companies.
Overall, results indicate no significant difference in the 
practice of shifting cultivation, hunting and NTFPs collection 
between certified and noncertified FMUs (indicators 1, 3 and 
5, Table 7). However, the local populations around certified 
FMUs perceive the presence of the FMU as a constraint to 
their uses more than the populations around noncertified 
FMUs (indicators 2, 4 and 6, Table 7).
Differences existed in hunting related to the period of 
harvesting. While all study villages, near both certified and 
noncertified FMUs, practiced hunting while harvesting was 
on-going, only 60% of villages had active hunting operations 
during pre- and post-harvest periods. Also, while people in 
all villages with on-going harvesting perceived logging as an 
opportunity for hunting, it was considered an opportunity by 
only 40% of villages in the pre-harvest period and 25% 
of villages in the post-harvest period. These numbers might 
reflect the fact that logging creates new access to the forest 
and thus gives more people the means to buy bushmeat, mak-
ing hunting more profitable, albeit illegal. When logging ends 
and roads are closed, as required by the law and certification, 
local people no longer perceive logging as an opportunity.
DISCUSSION
Results indicate that, between certified and noncertified 
FMUs, differences were relevant on many indicators 
measured as proxies for the quality of working and living 
conditions (hypothesis 1), and for the quality, legitimacy and 
effectiveness of institutions and benefit-sharing mechanisms 
(hypothesis 2). Differences were more nuanced in the impacts 
on customary practices, such as shifting cultivation, hunting 
damages (indicator 8, Table 6). In all cases reviewed during 
fieldwork, compensation was monetary, generally with the 
company disbursing the agreed amounts to an ad hoc com-
mission established between the claimants and the company, 
in the presence of state officials. 
A significant association also exists between certification 
and whether companies would adopt private, voluntary 
benefit-sharing schemes in addition to those legally mandated 
law. These are funds that logging companies provided to 
neighbouring villages, generally through the local institu-
tions, to improve local livelihoods and foster local develop-
ment. In general, the objectives of institutions and people 
representing them in certified vs. noncertified FMUs reflected 
a long- vs. short-term vision. This difference also led to dif-
ferent institutional settings for benefit-sharing mechanisms. 
Companies with certified FMUs tended to group villages 
to create joint or ‘embedded’ institutions (Ostrom 1990), 
irrespective of the harvesting stage. This was for financial 
reasons, mainly to minimize transaction costs and increase 
the amounts disbursed to each group, because companies gen-
erally sustained the costs of keeping a regular communication 
channel open with all villages, not only those neighbouring 
annual allowable cuts. 
Although it was relatively easy to discuss with companies 
the types of redistributive schemes adopted, the collection of 
reliable data on redistributed amounts was far more difficult. 
Data received from four companies with certified FMUs 
in two countries indicated an average amount distributed 
of about €55,000 per company per annum. On a per capita 
basis, this would be an average of €56 per person per year, or 
about 16 percent of the €350 annual average rural income in 
Cameroon (INS 2002).
Customary uses
Local uses of forest resources in FMUs are officially recog-
nized, but this recognition has limitations. Lacking an offi-
cially approved, previously negotiated national land use map, 
TABLE 6 Synthesis of results (institutions, percent of sampled villages)
  FSC non-FSC
Institutions and benefit-sharing mechanisms in sampled villages (N=69)  
1 Existing institutions  69% 31%***
2 Active institutions vs. existing ones  96% 73%
3 Active institutions established by current company  63% 20%**
4 Written procedures to manage institutions  85% 53%**
5 Election of members (vs. appointment)  86% 53%**
6 External membership authorised  63% 7%***
7 Periodic renewal of members  89% 60%***
8 Mechanisms for damage compensation to rural population 100% 25%***
9 Private benefit-sharing mechanisms 100% 44%**
10 Annual redistribution to all villages  89% 33%**
Notes: .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *.
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and NTFP gathering (hypothesis 3). People were more aware 
that new rules applied in certified FMUs, and they thus felt 
more constrained, but results do not show significant differ-
ences between the daily activities of people living near certi-
fied FMUs and those of people living near noncertified ones.
Overall, the impression conveyed by interviewees (both 
managers and workers) was that differences between certified 
and noncertified FMUs were due to the nature of forest certi-
fication. Not only is the FSC Standard more detailed than 
national laws, it is also regularly updated, controlled and 
verified. National laws do not uphold as high a standard and 
are weakly implemented and verified.
Working and living conditions
Major differences were found in the existence and effective 
implementation of clear written procedures that regulate 
working and living conditions in the sawmills, during forestry 
operations, and in the bases vie. The quality of life had 
improved since certification was granted: Essential services 
such as water supply and medical facilities were guaranteed; 
housing, electricity and waste management contributed to 
improved living conditions; and workers were more satisfied 
with prices and products available at the local minimarkets 
near certified FMUs.
Some variables, like health and life insurance and contrac-
tual agreements, are largely regulated by national laws. 
Although the timber company’s respect for the law is surely 
one of the final buyers’ basic expectations from certified 
timber, it is not to be taken for granted in countries were 
governance, notably in the forestry sector, is weak, and where 
existing laws are often inequitable.
These results corroborate findings in other regions of the 
world that certification could serve as an incentive to comply 
with the law or even to help enforce the law where compli-
ance and enforcements are weak (e.g. Durst et al. 2006, 
Espach 2006). Yet they also raise questions about companies 
with noncertified FMUs that are allowed to conduct opera-
tions without respecting national regulations. For instance, 
many interviewed workers were well aware of their irregular 
situation, but the lack of legal recourse and alternative 
employment options, and the asymmetrical power relations 
with both company and state officials, left them few means to 
improve their condition.
Institutions
Active institutions through which the local populations and 
the company can regularly discuss issues are arguably the 
most distinctive feature of certified FMUs. Companies must 
strive to increase the institutions’ legitimacy, effectiveness 
and, most importantly, their long-term sustainability (e.g. see 
Tsanga et al. 2014 for Cameroon), but they are testimony to 
one clear positive change that certification can bring about, 
again corroborating results in other parts of the world (e.g. 
Ulybina and Fennell 2013). 
Nominally at least, such institutions included women and 
marginalised groups as members. There is still a long way to 
go to reach fairness and equity in decision-making, and some 
interviewees stated that the inclusion of such groups “is not in 
our customs,” but overall results showed that current institu-
tions do include them. Further research is however needed to 
assess to what degree the voices of such groups are accounted 
for in the institutions’ final deliberations and to suggest 
possible ways of improvement.
Meanwhile, however, the same type of institutional space 
must be provided for all villages in and around certified 
FMUs. The current average rate of villages with institutions 
(69% of total villages), although significantly higher than 
in noncertified FMUs (31%), indicates that efforts are still 
needed even on the part of companies with certified FMUs, in 
order to reach all villages. To that aim, we believe the FSC, 
and certifying bodies in particular, should push companies to 
draw a clear roadmap for the creation of institutions, with 
milestones to be checked in subsequent audits.
Given the weak role played so far by state officials in 
setting up and sustain local institutions, albeit such role is 
oftentimes mandated by the law, one could argue that, through 
the current model, non-state actors such as FSC might 
compound the problems of creating institutions that only 
serve the purpose of obtaining and maintaining certification, 
irrespective of the existing local context or previously estab-
lished institutions. Hence, it is important for the FSC and 
certifying bodies to also check that institutions supported by 
companies are sufficiently related to the local context (e.g. 
existing institutions), in order to avoid a proliferation that 
only serves one limited purpose and might engender competi-
tion and negative impacts on overall local legitimacy and 
effectiveness of existing institutions.
 TABLE 7 Synthesis of results (customary uses, percent of sampled villages)
  FSC non-FSC
Customary uses (N=69)   
1 Shifting cultivation inside FMU 44%  33%
2 FMU perceived as a constraint to shifting cultivation 43%  14%
3 Hunting inside FMU 89% 100%
4 FMU perceived as a constraint to hunting 83%  50%
5 NTFP gathering inside FMU 67% 100%
6 FMU perceived as a constraint to NTFP gathering 17%   0%
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these practices are, however, illegal. In particular, shifting 
cultivation in fields that did not already exist when an FMU 
was established, or that occur in specifically delimited areas, 
and hunting and NTFP collection with non-traditional means 
and for commercial purposes are banned in all three study 
countries.
While the level of reported activities inside the FMU is 
similar for certified and noncertified FMUs, people living 
around certified FMUs perceive the pressure of new regula-
tions more than people living around noncertified FMUs. 
This is because companies with certified FMUs establish 
procedures and rules to enforce the law and hire personnel to 
enforce them. Communities perceive those efforts as a new 
constraint that goes against their customary rights.
Given weak law enforcement, companies with noncerti-
fied FMUs are under much less pressure to implement the 
law, especially on matters not directly related to timber 
harvesting. They can thus adopt a position of greater tolerance 
of local customs, even when they break the law. As a result, 
social peace is paradoxically more likely to be maintained 
in noncertified FMUs than certified ones, as on-the-ground 
interactions with the local populations exerting their custom-
ary uses are limited in the former. Yet, the natural answer 
of companies with certified FMUs to palliate such risk has 
been to regularly and intensively use dialogue platforms to 
find negotiated solutions. They are not always effective, but 
we believe they are a step in the right direction.
More broadly, these results point to a tension that may 
arise in certified FMUs between the obligation to respect FSC 
Principles 1 (Compliance with the law) and 3 (Indigenous 
peoples’ rights). All companies face an ethical dilemma when 
responding to customary rights and practices, as they are 
almost always the primary source of income for rural people: 
agriculture, hunting and NTFP gathering have been practiced 
for centuries under rules that have great social legitimacy, 
even when made illegal by modern laws. Thus, for both 
economic and cultural reasons, any company’s action that 
puts them at risk would incite intense local opposition. 
Furthermore, even when the will and the financial resources 
exist, it can be difficult for companies to oppose customary 
practices. Hunting and gathering are practiced by thousands 
of people who cannot easily be controlled. Companies may 
have an obligation to control customary practices, but only 
the state has the power to sanction. Yet, state officials have 
neither the means nor the time to enforce the law in the vast 
territories in question. Hence, companies have to support state 
efforts (e.g. through the provisions of vehicles and fuel), even 
if they are reluctant to provide this funding. When they do, as 
in the case of hunting, logging companies are often unable to 
distinguish between customary and non-customary hunting 
practices (i.e. bushmeat trading), especially before they are 
carried out. Hence, companies, especially those with certified 
FMUs, tend to apply the same rules to all hunting. This often 
infringes legal rights to customary and subsistence hunting 
(e.g. Tiani et al. 2005).
Compensation is an alternative to enforcement, and more 
effective mechanisms of compensation have been developed 
in certified FMUs than in noncertified ones. For instance, 
cultivated areas are usually much better identified and their 
destruction or abandonment is officially compensated by the 
Benefit-sharing mechanisms
Arguably, the reduction of logging companies’ responsibili-
ties vis-à-vis the local populations was one of the implicit 
targets of the current laws in all sample countries. Companies 
used to be expected to support the development of local com-
munities by providing both cash and in kind benefits. The new 
laws converted those benefits into a fee managed by the state, 
which in turn took responsibility for poverty reduction and 
development of local communities, through the equitable 
redistribution of those fees. 
The expected impacts, however, have not yet materialized 
(e.g. see Ndjanyou and Majerowicz 2004, Cerutti et al. 2010 
for Cameroon). Hence, people continue to turn to the compa-
nies for financial and in-kind support rather than working 
through the new legal frameworks. Companies tend to fund 
social peace with private contributions in order to avoid dis-
ruptions that could negatively affect both their business and 
the positive national and international image gained through 
certification. Yet, more research is needed to assess the local 
impacts of such schemes, as companies may also trade short-
term social peace—very much monitored by certifying bodies 
and NGOs—with the long-term effectiveness in the use of the 
funds—very much less monitored. 
We argue private schemes may also have unintended 
consequences, such as supporting the deresponsibilisation of 
the state. In these circumstances, certification is in effect put 
in the awkward position of sending a potentially wrong signal 
to both citizens and the state. Citizens perceive that, despite 
dysfunctional or failed public schemes, certification forces 
companies to maintain the flow of funds toward them, main-
taining or even increasing their dependence on companies. At 
the same time state officials take for granted that companies 
with certified FMUs will keep disbursing funds to the local 
populations to maintain social peace, which benefits the state 
as well as the companies in spite of the government’s poor 
performance in managing public schemes. This trend could 
provide a disincentive for the state to fulfil its responsibilities 
to citizens by allowing it to take advantage of the way private 
schemes make up for the state’s shortcomings.
It is difficult to provide simple solutions to this conun-
drum. It involves long-term political issues of state and 
civil-society formation as well as practical, short-term issues 
related to economic sustainability and how to spread certifica-
tion further in the Congo basin. One possibility is for national 
legislators to consider using incentives—of which financial 
ones could be the easier to use in the short-term (e.g. Karsenty 
2010)—to encourage socially responsible behaviour in 
general and certification in particular. Public regulations 
and certification schemes could and should work together to 
encourage better management of the forest and improved 
livelihoods for its inhabitants. If the current situation remains 
unchanged, the risk is for certification to push companies 
back to function as a state within the state (Singer 2008). 
Customary rights
Study results indicate that the presence of an FMU, certified 
or not, is not associated with significant differences in local 
agriculture, hunting or NTFP collection practices. Some of 
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operator. This does not answer, however, the question of 
where else the local populations can go to practice their 
activities, especially in the more populated areas. If anything, 
they can be pushed towards less monitored areas, such as 
noncertified FMUs or protected areas. More research is 
needed to assess such externalities of certification.
Alternatively, companies could initiate a legal procedure 
to return part of the land to state control so that people can 
practice shifting cultivation on it. This could at least partly 
redress the past mistakes made in attributing FMUs before 
their borders were effectively negotiated with the local popu-
lations. Yet, the renegotiation of borders is resisted by most 
state officials and civil servants because a reduction in the 
area an FMU would result in a reduction of the annual area fee 
that a company has to pay, in turn resulting in a reduction in 
payments through legally-mandated benefit-sharing schemes. 
Indeed, results indicate that state officials prefer to tolerate 
the practice of shifting cultivation inside FMUs, even though 
it is against the law.
On the positive side, all these interactions and negotia-
tions in certified FMUs contribute to the improvement and 
activities of the existing institutions, as they occur during 
official gatherings and are often integrated in the annual 
plan of logging operations discussed and approved there. 
Challenges and limitations remain, however, inasmuch 
several customary activities are conducted on an individual 
or family basis, and are thus not easy to regulate through 
collective institutions. On the negative side, most local popu-
lations will only rarely see any improvement until interactions 
remain confined to certified FMUs, which still cover a tiny 
minority of concession area in the Congo basin.
CONCLUSION
This article assessed the social performance of a set of FSC-
certified forest management units (FMUs) and compared 
it with the performance of similar noncertified FMUs in 
Cameroon, the Republic of Congo and Gabon. We found that 
certified FMUs: i) provide better working and living condi-
tions for workers and their families; ii) have more inclusive 
and better governed institutions for negotiations between the 
local population and logging companies, except with regard 
to conflict-resolution mechanisms; iii) have better managed 
and more effective benefit-sharing mechanisms; and iv) adopt 
innovative ways of dealing with problems related to infringe-
ment of customary uses, which remains one of the most 
thorny issues that companies face in certified FMUs.
Our results indicate that certification can be significantly 
associated with better social outcomes. Because of the large 
number of variables that could influence the decisions of log-
ging companies and their social impacts, it remains difficult 
to assert that certified FMUs would not have performed 
equally well in the absence of certification. However, such 
results and the fact that most certified companies were not 
reputed for their social and legal performances in the 1990s 
(e.g. Durrieu de Madron and Ngaha 2000, Forests Monitor 
2001) suggest that causality may be plausible. 
Apart from managers’ specific preferences or market-
dependent decisions that were not assessed by this study, the 
most evident triggers that cause companies to improve their 
social performance seem to be: i) the need to maintain a 
permanent channel of communication with the local popula-
tion, in order to avoid unexpected disruptions or social 
conflicts that might interfere with operations; ii) the periodic, 
regular and effective controls embedded in certification; and 
iii) improved reputational risk management.
Measured positive changes do not yet mean positive long-
term impacts on the livelihoods of all people living in and 
around certified FMUs. Also, further research is needed on 
the crucial areas of elite capture, embezzlement and corrupt 
practices, notably by state officials, which also have negative 
impacts on the populations’ livelihoods (e.g. Cerutti et al. 
2013). Although such issues are neither limited to the forestry 
sector nor easily tackled at the FMU level, one would expect 
a stronger push towards improved practices and behaviours 
from companies with certified FMUs than from those willing 
to maintain the status quo. Indeed, there should not be com-
placency from the FSC or logging companies with certified 
FMUs in comparing themselves with the worst performers, 
as the logic of the FSC is to reward more responsible forest 
managers who are assessed against ever-evolving standards, 
irrespective of the quality of national laws. 
Yet, results indicate that if any step in the direction of 
implementing the social targets of sustainable forest manage-
ment has been made in the Congo basin, that step has been 
encouraged by certification. Sometimes change simply meant 
correcting poor governance, such as lack of law enforcement. 
Sometimes, as in the case of some working and living condi-
tions, it meant making the additional efforts expected by 
the FSC. In still other cases, as with private benefit-sharing 
mechanisms, it meant redressing a negative situation created 
by the lack of a state presence to fulfil the FSC mandate.
Challenges remain, however, especially in relation to 
customary uses. Paradoxically, findings indicate that social 
peace may more easily be maintained—and negative impacts 
on customary uses may be limited—in noncertified FMU, 
managed or not, than in certified ones, because of the ‘non-
intervention’ of logging companies in those areas.
Although differences still remain among certified FMUs, 
they clearly stand apart from most noncertified FMUs, except 
those that have shown an intention to seek certification, both 
in deeds, for example by adopting a third-party-audited chain-
of-custody, and in words, for instance through their commu-
nication efforts and during interviews held for this study. The 
current social situation in the average noncertified FMU is 
somewhat worrying in terms of the interpretation that sustain-
able forest management is given by most state organisations 
mandated to regulate the forestry sector in the Congo basin. 
That is, an almost unique focus on timber harvesting with 
insufficient attention paid to social issues. Even more worry-
ing is, of course, that a large number of FMUs in the three 
countries studied do not have an approved management plan 
(35% of the total FMUs in Cameroon, 69% in Gabon, 87% in 
the Republic of the Congo). In those cases, it is arguably safe 
to assume that timber harvesting assumes an even stronger 
focus, with no basis left on which social criteria and indica-
tors (or lack thereof) can be monitored, and indeed sanctioned 
if need be.
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More broadly, the focus on timber also has implications 
for the “pragmatic focus on legality” (European Commission 
2004: 1) that all countries in the Congo basin have embraced 
in the past decade. Such focus will only bear generalized pos-
itive social outcomes insofar as the state is willing to enforce 
social regulations. Our sense from the fieldwork conducted 
for this study is that implementation of social initiatives 
outside certified FMUs risks remaining negligible in the short 
to medium term, for two main reasons. First, state officials 
in charge of controlling daily forestry operations lack the 
capacity to monitor social implementation and impacts, 
because this is not part of their training, experience or terms 
of reference. Second, while social issues do feature in the 
laws’ general objectives, they carry low political and financial 
significance in forest policies and in implementing regulations. 
From the final buyers’ perspective, this is a point worth 
stressing. The impression we received from this study is that 
by “weeding out the bottom” (Steering Committee 2012, 
Appendix F, A-103), the current efforts to verify the legality 
of tropical timber production might be able to clean timber 
supply chains from the worst ecological performers, e.g. 
those companies that do not respect even the most basic of 
silvicultural rules, such as minimum harvesting diameters 
or annual allowable cuts. This is because such rules, largely 
related to timber harvesting, can be checked by local state 
officials through the monitoring of official documentation, 
including but not limited to approved management plans. 
Yet verification strategies will need to go beyond the cur-
rently mandated official documentation, and adopt improved 
and innovative ways of legality verification, if the worst 
social performers are also to be sanctioned, by the state or the 
market.
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